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1. Introduction
This paper argues that deictic verbs GO and COME (English go and come and their
counterparts in other languages) are kinds of indexicals in the Kaplanian sense. In
Sections2-3, buildingonOshima(2006a), Idefendtheviewthattheacceptabilityof
deicticverbs is determinedwith respect to a contextuallyprovidedset of individuals
(rather than with respect to a speciﬁc individual that serves as the “deictic center”),
and demonstrate that the pragmatic meanings associated with deictic verbs are both
presuppositional and indexical.
In Sections 4-6, I address the “deictic perspective shift” phenomenon in at-
titude reports, and argue that GO/COME can be used either as primary indexicals
(which refer to the external context of utterance) or as secondary indexicals (which
refer to a secondary context associated with an attitude predicate). Also, I demon-
strate that the choice of the deictic perspective has interesting correlations with
projection patterns of presuppositions associated with deictic verbs.
In Sections 7-9, I develop an analysis of attitude reports where a presup-
position may be ﬁltered by an attitude predicate (in accordance with Heim 1992
and Karttunen 1974), or may be inherited through it. The proposed analysis pro-
vides a solution to the more general (and long-standing) problem for the theory of
presupposition projection, which has been known as “de re presuppositions”.
2. The Set-based Analysis of GO and COME
As the background theory of motion deixis, I adopt the “set-based” analysis pro-
posed by Oshima (2006a). Its essential idea is that deictic verbs make reference to
a set of individuals called RP (which stands for “Reference Point”) and their mean-
ings involve an existential statement or the negation of an existential statement; i.e.:
(1) a. GO requires that no member of the RP be located at the goal of the de-
scribed motion.
b. COME requires that some member of the RP be located at the goal of the
described motion.
Cross-linguistic differences among motion deictic systems can be sorted
out into two dimensions. First, different languages are subject to different sets of
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 person-based restrictions as to what can or must be a member of the RP. In English,
for example:
(2) a. The speaker is always a member of the RP.
b. In many situations, it is preferred for the addressee to be a member of the
RP as well.
c. Athirdpersonentitycan bechosenasamemberoftheRPifitisdiscourse-
salient. Inclusion of a non-SAP entity is marginal, however, when the
speaker or the addressee is the theme (the moving entity) (or, when the
theme is a group, a member thereof).
Thus, in English, typically the RP = {the speaker, the addressee}.
Second, particular instances of deictic verbs may differ from one another as
to which lower stretch of the following hierarchy they make reference to.
(3) an RP member’s location at the utterance time < an RP member’s location
at the event time < an RP member’s “home base” (at the event time)
For example, in English, go refers to the utterance time only, while come refers to
the utterance time, the event time, and RP members’ home bases. This, in conjunc-
tion with (1), amounts to the following:
(4) a. Go requires that no member of the RP be at the goal at the utterance time.
b. Come requires that (i) there be some member of the RP at the goal at the
utterance time or at the event time, or (ii) the goal be the home base of a
member of the RP (at the event time).
The set-based analysis makes correct predictions on data like the following:1
(5) Will you {*go/come} visit me?
(The speaker must be a member of the RP.)
(6) Can I {??go/come} visit you?
(It is preferred for the addressee to be a member of the RP.)
(7) a. John should {go/come} to talk to Prof. Yamada.
b. I should {go/??come} to talk to Prof. Yamada.
(Inclusion of a third person entity in the RP is marginal when the speaker is
the theme.)
The pragmatic meanings encoded by GO and COME satisfy the standard
criteria for presuppositions. First, they survive under negation; e.g. (8a) and (8b)
both entail (roughly) that the speaker or the addressee is or was in New York.
(8) a. John came to New York.
1Advantages of the set-based analysis over its alternatives, such as those proposed by Fillmore
(1997) and Talmy (2000), are discussed in detail in Oshima (2006a,b).
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Also, when a clause containing a deictic verb is embedded as a consequent of a con-
ditional, the whole sentence does not (necessarily) inherit the relevant entailment;
this projection pattern too suggests that the pragmatic entailment associated with a
deictic verb is a presupposition.2
(9) If I had been in San Jose, John would have come (there), too.
ps: The speaker or the addressee is or was in San Jose.
3. GO/COME as Indexicals
Themeanings ofdeicticverbs are context-sensitivein thesensethat they refer to the
contextually determined RP. I propose to treat the RP as a component of the context
of utterance in the Kaplanian sense and to add the coordinate of RP to the context
tuple, so that it looks like:  agent, (addressee,) time, place, RP . Accordingly,
deicticpredicates can betreated as kindsofindexicalexpressions(on apar withﬁrst
person pronouns, etc.), in the sense that their meanings (contents) are contingent on
the context of utterance.
The following example, which contains three indexicals (I, the past tense,
and here) illustrates the general treatment of indexicals I adopt in the present work
(an extensional logic with world variables, instead of a modal/tense logic, is used
as the meaning language):
(10) I danced here  → lw[∃e[dance(w, e, Ag(c∗)) ∧
T-loc(w, e) < Time(c∗) ∧ S-loc(w, e) = Place(c∗)]]
where3
(11) a. JAg(c)Kc,w,g = the agent coordinate of JcKc,w,g
b. JTime(c)Kc,w,g = the time coordinate of JcKc,w,g
c. JPlace(c)Kc,w,g = the place coordinate of JcKc,w,g
d.JRP(c)Kc,w,g = the RP coordinate of JcKc,w,g
(12) a. JT-loc(e, w)Kc,w,g = the temporal location of JeKc,w,g in JwKc,w,g
b. JS-loc(e, w)Kc,w,g = the spatial location of JeKc,w,g in JwKc,w,g
and
2This contrasts with, for example, the case of a gender requirement posed by a pronoun:
(i) If Chrisi takes this magic potion which turns any man or woman into a beautiful girl, many
boys will be attracted to heri.
entailment: Chris is female (regardless of whether she takes the potion).
3N.B.: JaKc,w,g = the value of a with respect to context c, world w, and assignment g.
174 David Y. Oshima(13) a. Jc∗Kc,w,g is deﬁned only if g(c∗) = c. If deﬁned Jc∗Kc,w,g = g(c∗).
(In other words, c∗ is a special variable that is always mapped the external
context of utterance.)
b. JciKc,w,g = g(ci).
The meanings of sentences involving go and come can be approximated
using the logical connective called prejunction (Blau’s 1985 term; the deﬁnition
follows):
(14) a. John went to San Jose  →
lw[∃e[[move-to(w, e, john, s.j.) ∧ T-loc(w, e) < Time(c∗)] /
¬∃y[y ∈ RP(c∗) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, s.j.) ∧ T-loc(w, e) ⊇
Time(c∗)]]]]
b. John came to San Jose  →
lw[∃e[[move-to(w, e, john, s.j.) ∧ T-loc(w, e) < Time(c∗)] /
∃y[y ∈ RP(c∗) ∧ [∃e[at(w, e, y, s.j.) ∧ [T-loc(w, e) ⊇ Time(c∗) ∨
TC(w, e, e)]] ∨ ∃e[home-base(w, e, john, s.j.) ∧
TC(w, e, e)]]]]]
where
(15) prejunction
Jf / yKw,c,g isdeﬁned only ifJyKw,c,g = 1. If deﬁned, Jf / yKw,c,g = JfKw,c,g.
(16) JT(emporal )C(oincidence)(w, e, e)Kc,w,g
= 1 iff JeKc,w,g and JeKc,w,g temporally overlap in JwKc,w,g
= 0 otherwise
4. “Deictic Perspective Shift” in Reported Discourse
In past studies, several authors have pointed out that in an attitude report the choice
betweengo/comecan bemadewithrespecttoeithertheprimary(external)speaker’s
perspective or the secondary (reported) agent’s (Hockett 1990, Kuno 1988, Oe
1975). The following examples illustrate this point (assume that the following sen-
tences are all uttered in a situation where the addressee is not at the goal either at
the utterance time or at the event time):
(17) [Situation: The speaker and the addressee are in Los Angeles; John is in
New York now, and will be there in two weeks too.]
a. John believes that I will go to New York in two weeks.
b. John believes that I will come to New York in two weeks.
cf. ??I will come to New York in two weeks.
(18) [Situation: The speaker and the addressee are in the same place.]
a. John claims that I should go to give him a hand.
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cf. ?*I should come to give John a hand.
(19) [Situation: The speaker and the addressee are in Los Angeles, and will be
there on Thursday too; John is in New York.]
a. John said that he would come to Los Angeles on Thursday.
b. John said that he would go to Los Angeles on Thursday.
cf. ??John will go to Los Angeles on Thursday.
(20) [Situation: The speaker and the addressee are in the same place. The
speaker is in the same place as he was a week ago.]
a. John believes that his brother came to give me a hand a week ago.
b. John believes that his brother went to give me a hand a week ago.
cf. ?*John’s brother went to give me a hand a week ago.
Inthecomplementclausesof(17b), (18b), (19b), and(20b), thechoiceofthedeictic
verb does not conform to the restrictions on the RP presented above. To explain
the acceptability of these sentences, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that in an
indirect quote the selection of the members of RP can be made from the secondary
agent’s perspective, rather than from the external speaker’s.4
In the followingtwo sections, we will observethat (i) the deictic perspective
shift phenomenon has interesting correlations with presupposition projection, and
(ii) the choice of the deictic perspective also directly corresponds to the de se/non-
de se opposition with respect to motion deixis.
4Under certain conditions, conﬁgurations like “[1st person] comes to [3rd person]” and “[3rd
person] goes to [1st person]” seem not to be entirely blocked in non-report environments (e.g.,
adverbial clauses), either:
(i) a. John may be ﬁred from his job if I don’t {go/?come} to give him a hand.
b. Ken will be able to ﬁnish the assignment by Friday if he {??∼?*goes/comes} to consult
me.
Based on such observations, one may suspect that the “deictic perspective shift” phenomenon is
not peculiar to attitude report environments. There are two reasons, however, to believe that this
is not the case. First, the acceptability of the marked patterns is generally higher in complement
clauses of attitude predicates than in adjunct clauses (see Oshima 2006b for a survey). Second,
the deictic perspective shift in attitude reports is not only relevant to the acceptability of the use
of GO/COME, but it also has correlations with the level to which presuppositions triggered by
GO/COME are projected, and this phenomenon cannot be explained by simply manipulating the
licensing conditions of GO/COME (see below).
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5.1. Primary Deictic Perspective and Attitude Predicates as Holes
It has been commonly believed that presuppositions in attitude report environments
are ﬁltered by (non-factive) attitude predicates like believe (Karttunen 1974, Heim
1992), i.e., “a believes f” does not presuppose ps(f) (the presupposition of f),
but only ‘a believes ps(f)’ (this view, however, will be questioned shortly).5 The
following example illustrates this point:
(21) John believes that Linda stopped smoking.
presupposes: John believes that Linda used to smoke.
does not presuppose: Linda used to smoke.
(22) John believes that Linda would smoke when she was a college student. He
also believes that she already stopped smoking.
This projection pattern, however, does not hold for presuppositions induced
by deictic predicates, when the deictic perspective is anchored to the primary (ex-
ternal) speaker. Consider the following example:
(23) [Situation: John is speaking to Linda. Bob has been in New York for a
month, and John believes that (Bob believes that) Bob has been in New
York for a month.]
John: “Bob believes that Chris came to San Jose two weeks ago.”
The RP adopted by John (in the external context of utterance) is likely to be: {John,
Linda}, while the one adopted by Bob (in the context of the reported belief) is
likely to be: {Bob}.6 Thus, in the described situation, the utterance above natu-
rally receives the “primary” interpretation, in which case the presupposition of the
complement clause is roughly equivalent to:
(24) John or Linda is in San Jose at the utterance time or was there at the event
time (two weeks ago).
Crucially, this presupposition is a presupposition of the whole sentence as well
(i.e., is projected to the matrix level). That is, (23) presupposes (24), rather than
something like:
(25) Bob believes that John or Linda is in San Jose at the utterance time or was
there at the event time.
5Speech predicates like say have a different heritage property, i.e., they can “plug”, rather than
“ﬁlter”, presuppositions under their scope (and under certain conditions, they can also pass up
presuppositions under their scope like mental attitude predicates like believe; see below) (Oshima
2006b). Due to space limitation, I will not consider them in the present work.
6Throughout the rest of the paper, I will assume that the RP adopted by the speaker of an utter-
ance is: {the speaker, the addressee}, and that the RP adopted by the agent of a reported attitude is:
{the agent}.
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question; Bob’s belief about the location of John or Linda is clearly irrelevant for
the felicity of (23) (Bob does not need to have any belief or knowledge concerning
John or Linda, for that matter).
5.2. Secondary Deictic Perspective and Attitude Predicates as Filters
Next let us consider a case where the deictic perspective is anchored to the sec-
ondary agent.
(26) [Situation: John is speaking to Linda; they have been in New York for a
month.]
John: “Bob believes that Chris came to San Jose two weeks ago.”
In the described situation, neither the external speaker nor the external addressee is
at the goal, and thus the utterance naturally receives the secondary interpretation.
The presupposition of the complement clause is then roughly equivalent to:
(27) Bob is in San Jose at the utterance time or was there at the event time (two
weeks ago).
This time, importantly, the presupposition is not projected to the matrix level, in
accordance with observations/predictions by Heim (1992) and Karttunen (1974).
What (26) presupposes is something like (28), but not (27). This can be conﬁrmed
by observing a discourse like (29).
(28) Bob believes that he is in San Jose at the utterance time or was there at the
event time.
(29) Bob (wrongly) believes that he has been in San Jose for a month, and he also
believes that Chris came there two weeks ago.
In sum, presuppositions triggered by GO and COME are passed up through
anattitudepredicatewhenthedeicticperspectiveisanchoredtotheexternalspeaker,
while they are ﬁltered when the deictic perspective is anchored to the secondary
agent.
6. The De Se/Non-De Se Distinction with respect to Motion Deixis
The opposition of the primary/secondary deictic perspectives has a direct corre-
spondence to the opposition of the non-de se/de se modes of attitude reports. That
is, a report from the primary perspective is a report that is non-de se with respect
to motion deixis, where (part of) the deictic information in the “original” (reported)
attitude (belief, etc.) is lost; a report from the secondary perspective, on the other
hand, is a report that is de se with respect to motion deixis, where such information
is maintained.
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se/non-de se alternation with respect to a context coordinate other than the RP. At-
titude predicates in Japanese allow either the de se or non-de se modes with respect
to the agent coordinate, i.e., a report of an attitude about the secondary agent can be
made either with a secondary indexical zibun or with a regular third person pronoun
kare, etc. (Oshima 2006b).
(30) a. Johni-wa
John-Top
[zibuni-ga
self-Nom
boku-o
I-Acc
tasuke-ta]
help-Past
to
Comp
omotte-i-ru.
believe-Asp-Pres
‘Johni believes that he*i helped me.’
(N.B.: he* is an artiﬁcial logophoric pronoun; cf. Schlenker 2003)
b. Johni-wa
John-Top
[karei-ga
he-Nom
boku-o
I-Acc
tasuke-ta]
help-Past
to
Comp
omotte-i-ru.
believe-Asp-Pres
‘Johni believes that hei helped me.’
(30a) in the de se mode is compatible only with Situation 1 in (31), while (30b) is
compatible either with Situation 1 or 2; in other words, the contrast between ‘I’ and
‘he’ in the original belief is lost in (30b).
(31) [David = the external speaker of (30)]
Situation 1: John believes: “I helped David”.
Situation 2: After reading his own biography, amnesic John has come to
believe: “This guy called John helped David”.
Now consider the followingreport where the deictic perspectiveis anchored
to the primary agent and the presupposition triggered by the deictic predicate is
passed up to the matrix level:
(32) John: “Bob believes that Chris came to San Jose.” (primary perspective)
ps: John (or the addressee) is in San Jose at the utterance time or was there
at the event time.
Such a sentence does not capture (a certain portion of) the deictic information in the
original belief. Recall that we decided to treat deictic predicates as indexicals; this
means that a pair of the form: “a goes to b”/“a comes to b” can, analogous to a
pairlike“I helped David”/“He helped David”, beequivalentin theircontent, but not
in their character. From (32), we cannot infer what propositional character exactly
John’s “original” belief corresponded to. It could have been ‘Chris came to San
Jose’, but it could as well have been ‘Chris went to San Jose’ or ‘Chris moved to
San Jose’. In other words, the contrast between go, come, and move in the original
belief is lost in the report; in this sense, such a report is non-de se with respect to
motion deixis.
In contrast, when the deictic perspective in an indirect report is anchored to
thesecondary agent, thedeicticinformationin theoriginalbeliefismaintained. The
following attitude report, for example, reﬂects that Bob’s belief was ‘Chris came to
San Jose’, rather than ‘Chris went to San Jose’, etc.:
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ps: Bob believes that he is in San Jose at the time of “believing”or was there
at the event time.
Such a report can be understood as de se with respect to motion deixis; also, an
occurrence of GO or COME in (the complement clause of) an attitude report from
the secondary perspective can be treated as an instance of secondary indexical on
a par with Japanese zibun (in its logophoric use), a logophoric pronoun, etc. (cf.
Schlenker 2003).
7. Questioning the Common View: Is an Attitude Predicate a Filter or a Hole?
The observations in Section 5 lead us to question the commonly accepted view that
attitude predicates are invariably ﬁlters, and suspect that they can pass up presuppo-
sitions within their scope under certain conditions. After all, data like (22) merely
prove that “a v’s f” (where v is an attitude predicate) does not necessarily presup-
pose ps(f). There have been, on the other hand, occasional remarks in the literature
that “a believes f” indeed may presuppose ps(f) (Zeevat 1992, Beaver and Zeevat
2004; cf. Heim 1992: 211-2). Consider the following example:
(34) John believes that even [Mary]F escaped.
On one reading, (34) presupposes that John believes that Mary was the least likely
person to escape; on this reading, the attitudepredicate serves as a ﬁlter. On another
reading, the ps trigger even takes the matrix scope, so that the presupposition of the
whole sentence is something like ‘Mary is the least likely person to be believed by
John to have escaped’; this reading is irrelevant to our present discussion. Now, it
appears that (34) has yet another reading, on which it presupposes that Mary was
actually the least likely person to escape, while John may or may not believe that
Mary was unlikely to escape.
(35) a. ps on the “narrow scope” reading: Johnbelievesthat Mary was theleast
likely person to escape. (In actuality, Mary may or may not have been the
least likely person to escape.)
b. ps on the “wide scope” reading: Mary is the least likely person to be
believed by John to have escaped.
c. ps on the “de re-like” reading: Mary was actually the least likely person
to escape. (John may or may not believe that Mary was the least likely
person to escape.)
The judgment is quite subtle, but I believe that the third reading is real. This ob-
servation suggests that the correct generalization about the heritage property (in the
sense of Heim 1983) of attitude predicates is the following:
(36) “a v’sf”, wherevisan attitudepredicatelikebelieve, hope, ..., presupposes
either ‘ps(f)’ or ‘a believes ps(f)’.
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and “ﬁlter” interpretations.
Under this new assumption, it is not necessary to give presuppositions as-
sociated with deictic verbs a special treatment. In a report where the deictic per-
spective is anchored to the primary agent, the attitude predicate behaves as a hole;
when it is anchored to the secondary agent, on the other hand, the attitude predicate
behaves as a ﬁlter.
As the reader may have noticed, the formulationin (36)makes thefollowing
prediction:
(37) Multiple ps’s triggered in the complement clause of an attitude report are
either uniformly ﬁltered by the attitude predicate, or uniformly passed up.
To give a concrete example, it is predicted that (38) presupposes that either (i)
(39a-i) and (39b-i) hold, or (ii) (39a-ii) and (39b-ii) hold:
(38) John believes that Linda will manage to come to his room.
(39) a. i. It is difﬁcult to get to John’s room.
ii.John believes that it is difﬁcult to get to his room.
b. i. The speaker or the addressee is or will be in John’s room.
ii.John believes that he is or will be in his room.
The following discourse sounds felicitous, as it should, (39a-ii) and (39b-ii) being
satisﬁed.
(40) [Situation: John is staying at a hotel room, and neither the speaker nor the
addressee is in John’s room.]
Being paranoiac, John believes that the hotel he is staying at is a securely
guarded fortress. John believes, however, that Linda will manage to come to
his room.
Now consider (41), where come is replaced with go. Analogous to the case of (38),
this sentence presupposes that either (i) (42a-i) and (42b-i) hold or (ii) (42a-ii) and
(42b-ii) hold:
(41) John believes that Linda will manage to go to his room.
(42) a. i. It is difﬁcult to get to John’s room.
ii.John believes that it is difﬁcult to get to his room.
b. i. Neither the speaker nor the addressee is in John’s room.
ii.John believes that he is not in his room.
The following discourse sounds awkward/infelicitous; again this is as it should be,
as in the described situation only (42-aii) and (42b-i) (but not 42a-i or 42b-ii) are
satisﬁed.
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addressee is in the same room.]
Being paranoiac, John believes that the hotel he is staying at is a securely
guarded fortress. ??John believes, however, that Linda will manage to go to
his room. (cf.
√
John believes, however, that Linda will go to his room.)
These observations suggest that the prediction in (37) is indeed correct.7
8. The Multi-dimensional Approach to Presuppositions
I adopt the multi-dimensional approach to presuppositions, where the dimensions
of assertion and presupposition are separated, and a sentence is evaluated either
as true/felicitous, false/felicitous, true/infelicitous, or false/infelicitous (Herzberger
1973, Bergmann 1981; cf. Karttunen and Peters 1979). More speciﬁcally, I postu-
late:
(44) Dt (the interpretation domain for formulas) =Ã({1,2})
(or in other words: Dt = {{1, 2},{1},{2}, ∅})
(45) Truth Deﬁnition: An expression lw[f] that serves as a translation of a
natural language matrix sentence is, with respect to c, w, and g,
a. true/felicitous (“True” for short) iff JfKc,w,g[w/w] = {1, 2}
b. false/felicitous (“False” for short) iff JfKc,w,g[w/w] = {2}
c. true/infelicitous (“True-ish” for short) iff JfKc,w,g[w/w] = {1}
d.false/infelicitous (“False-ish” for short) iff JfKc,w,g[w/w] = ∅
That is, value1 and 2 concern the truth (satisfaction of the assertion) and the felicity
(satisfaction of the presupposition) of a formula, respectively. It is assumed that
predicate constants (such as laugh, student, and move-to) and set operators (as
they are used in the meaning language) have, when applied to their arguments,
either {1, 2} or {2} as their value.
The standard operators/connectives in boolean systems are redeﬁned as fol-
lows:8
(46) a. negation
1 ∈ J¬fKc,w,g iff 1  ∈ JfKc,w,g;
2 ∈ J¬fKc,w,g iff 2 ∈ JfKc,w,g
7This reasoning, of course, is valid only under the possibly simplistic assumption that a given
occurrence of an operator (e.g., an attitude predicate, a connective) behaves either as a hole or
ﬁlter (or plug) for all classes of ps’s (including those triggered by deictic verbs, focus-sensitive
particles like too, and factive predicates like regret) under its scope. This is an implicit assumption
in most previouswork on presupposition,and I maintain it in the present work too. It must be noted,
however,that whether this uniformityassumption is valid is a matter of open debate (see Beaver and
Zeevat 2004 for relevant discussion).
8The operators/connectives in (46a-g) are not proposed as translations or direct counterparts of
not, and, all, etc. in natural language; see Oshima (2006b) for relevant discussion.
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1 ∈ Jf ∧yKc,w,g iff 1 ∈ JfKc,w,g and 1 ∈ JyKc,w,g;
2 ∈ Jf ∧yKc,w,g iff 2 ∈ JfKc,w,g and 2 ∈ JyKc,w,g
c. disjunction
1 ∈ Jf ∨yKc,w,g iff 1 ∈ JfKc,w,g or 1 ∈ JyKc,w,g;
2 ∈ Jf ∨yKc,w,g iff 2 ∈ JfKc,w,g and 2 ∈ JyKc,w,g
d.conditional
1 ∈ Jf → yKc,w,g iff (i) 1  ∈ JfKc,w,g or (ii) 1 ∈ JfKc,w,g and 1 ∈ JyKc,w,g;
2 ∈ Jf → yKc,w,g iff 2 ∈ JfKc,w,g and 2 ∈ JyKc,w,g
e. universal quantiﬁer
1 ∈ J∀vafKc,w,g iff 1 ∈
\
d∈Da(JfKc,w,g[d/v]);
2 ∈ J∀vafKc,w,g iff 2 ∈
\
d∈Da(JfKc,w,g[d/v])
f. existential quantiﬁer
1 ∈ J∃vafKc,w,g iff 1 ∈
[
d∈Da(JfKc,w,g[d/v]);
2 ∈ J∃vafKc,w,g iff 2 ∈
[
d∈Da(JfKc,w,g[d/v])
g.lambda operator
JlvafKc,w,g = that function f such that for each d ∈ Da, f(d) = JfKc,w,g[d/v]
Furthermore, a new connective named preditional (a variant of Blau’s “prejunc-
tion”/Blamey’s “transplication”) is introduced:
(47) preditional
1 ∈ J f;y Kc,w,g iff 1 ∈ JfKc,w,g;
2 ∈ J f;y Kc,w,g iff (i) 2 ∈ JfKc,w,g and 2 ∈ JyKc,w,g and (ii) 1 ∈ JyKc,w,g
A sentence associated with a presupposition can be given a proper logical
form with thisnew connective. Forexample, “[John]F laughed, too”(ps: Somebody
other than John laughed) can be translated as (48) (the tense is ignored).9
(48) lw[∃e[ laugh(w, e, john); ∃x[∃e[x  = john ∧ laugh(w, e, x)]] ]]
As can be easily conﬁrmed, (48) is evaluated as True-ish when John laughed and
nobody other than John laughed, and as False-ish when nobody, including John,
laughed.
To represent the heritage property of attitude predicates, the two operators
deﬁned below, which correspond to the T and g operators in Bergmann’s (1981)
system, will come in handy:
(49) a. assertion extractor (presupposition remover)
JConv(f)Kc,w,g = {1, 2} iff 1 ∈ JfKc,w,g;
JConv(f)Kc,w,g = {2} otherwise
b. presupposition extractor (assertion remover)
JConv(f)Kc,w,g = {1, 2} iff 2 ∈ JfKc,w,g;
JConv(f)Kc,w,g = {2} otherwise
9Here, I adopt the existential analysis of too along the lines of Kartunnen and Peters (1979); see
van der Sandt and Geurts (2001) for an opposing view.
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{{1, 2},{1},{2}, ∅}) into two propositions (whose range is: {{1, 2}, {2}}) which
correspond to its asserted part and its presupposed part, respectively:
(50) a. The assertion of ‘S’, which denotes proposition p, can be expressed as:
lw[Conv(p(w))]
b. The presupposition of ‘S’, which denotes proposition p, can be expressed
as: lw[Conv(p(w))]
The lexical entries of go/come (as primary indexicals) can be given as fol-
lows:
(51) a. go  → lpl[lx[le[lw[ move-to(w, e, x, pl);
¬∃y[y ∈ RP(c∗) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, pl) ∧
T-loc(w, e) ⊇ Time(c∗)]] ]]]]
b. come  → lpl[lx[le[lw[ move-to(w, e, x, pl);
∃y[y ∈ RP(c∗) ∧ [∃e[at(w, e, y, pl) ∧ [T-loc(w, e) ⊇ Time(c∗)
∨ TC(w, e, e)]] ∨ ∃e[home-base(w, e, x, pl) ∧
TC(w, e, e)]]] ]]]]
For ease of presentation, in the following I will use the simpliﬁed representations
given below, where temporal speciﬁcations as to RP members’ presence at the goal
and the reference to RP members’ home bases are left out.
(52) a. go  → lpl[lx[le[lw[ move-to(w, e, x, pl);
¬∃y[y ∈ RP(c∗) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, pl)]] ]]]]
b. come  → lpl[lx[le[lw[ move-to(w, e, x, pl);
∃y[y ∈ RP(c∗) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, pl)]] ]]]]
9. An Alternative Theory of PS Projection through Attitude Predicates
We are now ready to develop a semantic analysis of attitude reports that involve
deictic verbs. I adopt the view that an attitude (e.g. belief) is a relation between an
individual and a propositional character (Schlenker 2003, Oshima 2006b). In a de
se attitude report, the original attitude is “faithfully” reported, while in a non-de se
report, the deictic (indexical) information in the original attitude is not maintained.
To give a concrete example, the logical forms of the de se and non-de se reports (in
Japanese) in (53a,b) can be roughly given as follows (the semantic contribution of
the matrix/embedded tenses is left out of consideration).
(53) a. Johni-wa
John-Top
zibuni-ga
self-Nom
yuumei-da
popular-be.Pres
to
Comp
omotte-i-ru.
believe-Asp-Pres
‘Johni believes that he*i is popular.’
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John-Top
karei-ga
he-Nom
yuumei-da
popular-be.Pres
to
Comp
omotte-i-ru.
believe-Asp-Pres
‘Johni believes that hei is popular.’
(54) (53a)  → lw[∃e[believe(w, e, john,
lc[lw[∃e[popular(w, e, Ag(c))]]])]]
(55) (53b)  → lw[∃e[∃c c, s,t  [∃r[believe(w, e, john, c) ∧
c( john, T-loc(w, e), S-loc(w, e), r ) =
lw[∃e[popular(w, e, x)]]])]]]
(N.B.) r, r, r, ... are variables over RP’s (sets of individuals).
In a de se report, the denotation of the complement clause is a propositional char-
acter, which directly corresponds to the object of the original attitude (for 53a, ‘I
am popular’). In a non-de se report, the denotation of the complement clause is a
propositional content, which is “less ﬁne-grained” than the object of the original
attitude; from (53b), for example, we can infer only that the original belief cor-
responds to some propositional character c such that when uttered by John, c
amounts to the propositional content ‘John is popular’ (and we cannot determine
whether the original belief is ‘I am popular’ or ‘John/he is popular’).10
One complication in this connection, however, is that in natural language
we ﬁnd attitude reports that are de se only with respect to a subset of the context
coordinates (i.e., agent, addressee, time, place, RP, etc.). To give an example, the
following report in Zazaki, which is adapted from Anand and Nevins (2004), is de
se with respect to place (and possibly time), but not with respect to agent.
(56) Waxto
when
kE
that
ma
we
D.-de
D.-at
bime,
were
H.
H.obv
m1-ra
me-at
va
said
kE
that
o
he
ita
here
ame
came
dina.
world
‘When we were in Diyarbekir, Hesen told me he was born in D.’
In the following, for ease of presentation, I exclude indexicals other than deictic
verbs from consideration, and assume (i) that attitude reports are either canonically
de se (i.e. de se with respect to all context coordinates) or canonically non-de se
(i.e. non-de se with respect to all context coordinates), and (ii) that (all) non-de se
attitude predicates behave as “holes” (for presuppositions) and (all) de se attitude
predicates behave as “ﬁlters”.11
9.1. Attitude Predicates as Holes
In a report where the deictic perspective is anchored to the primary agent (the ex-
ternal speaker), the presupposed/indexical part of the original attitude is underspec-
iﬁed; for instance, when “Bob believes that Chris came to San Jose” is interpreted
10The RP variable r (and its binder) in (53b) is used merely as a “place holder”, and does not
contribute to the meaning of the whole sentence in any substantial way.
11See Oshima (2006b) for discussion of semantic treatments of “partially de se” attitude reports
like (56).
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is or was in San Jose’, John’s original belief could have been either ‘Chris went to
San Jose’, ‘Chris came to San Jose’, or ‘Chris moved to San Jose’. The assertion
and presupposition of an attitude report with an attitude predicate that serves as a
“hole” can be schematized as follows:
(57) “a v’s f”, where v is a hole and f denotes the propositional content p,
a. asserts: thata is related bytheattituderelationdenotedbyvwithapropo-
sitional character c, such that c(c) where c is the context of a’s v-ing
amounts to the propositional content p, such that the asserted part of p
is equivalent to the asserted part of p;
b. presupposes: the presupposed part of p.
The logical representation of an attitude verb like (58), where pp stands for
“primary perspective”, brings out these effects:
(58) believepp  →
lp s,t [lx[le[lw[ ∃c[∃r[∀w[Conv(p(w))≡
Conv(c( x, T-loc(w, e), S-loc(w, e), r )(w))] ∧
believe(w, e, x, c)]]; Conv(p(w)) ]]]]
The derivation of an attitude report where a deictic predicate is anchored to the
primary perspective is illustrated below. (61) guarantees that (59) (i) (roughly)
presupposes that John (or the addressee) is or was in San Jose, and (ii) asserts that
the character corresponding to Bob’s original belief is such that it is equivalent
to ‘Chris came to San Jose’ when presupposition and indexical information are
ignored.12
(59) John: “Bob believes that Chris came to San Jose.” (primary perspective)
ps: John (or the addressee) is or was in San Jose.
(60) that Chris came to San Jose  →
lw[∃e[ move-to(w, e, chris, s.j.); ∃y[y ∈ RP(c∗) ∧
∃e[at(w, e, y, s.j.)]] ]]
(61) Bob believespp that Chris came to San Jose  →
lw[∃e[ ∃c[∃r[∀w[Conv(∃e[ move-to(w, e, chris, s.j.);
∃y[y ∈ RP(c∗) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, s.j.)]] ])≡
Conv(c( x, T-loc(w, e), S-loc(w, e), r )(w))] ∧
believe(w, e, bob, c)]]; Conv(∃e[ move-to(w, e, chris, s.j.);
∃y[y ∈ RP(c∗) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, s.j.)]] ]) ]]
12In the derivation process, I assume that the lambda-boundevent variable introduced by a predi-
cate is (replaced by another variable that is) existentially bound at the VP or S node.
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As mentioned earlier, attitude predicates can be “ﬁlters” too, which pass up the
presupposition of their complement clause in a modiﬁed form (Karttunen 1974,
Heim 1992):
(62) “a v’s f”, where v is a ﬁlter and f denotes the propositional character c,
a. asserts: that a is related by the attitude relation denoted by v with c;
b. presupposes: that a is related by the “believing” relation with the presup-
posed part of c.
The logical translation of an attitude predicate as a ﬁlter can be given as
follows (sp stands for “secondary perspective”):
(63) believesp  → lc[lx[le[lw[ believe(w, e, x, c);
∃e[believe(w, e, x, lc[lw[Conv(c(c)(w))]])] ]]]]
Let us consider the logical representation of an attitude report where the deictic
perspective is anchored to the secondary perspective:
(64) John: “Bob believes that Chris came to San Jose.” (secondary perspective)
ps: Bob believes that he is or was in San Jose.
Deictic verbs that are interpreted with respect to a secondary context can be un-
derstood as instances of secondary indexicals. For the sake of technical simplicity,
I will take the view that deictic verbs (in languages like English and Japanese) are
ambiguousbetweenprimaryindexicalsandsecondaryindexicalsatthelexicallevel.
The logical translations of go and come as secondary indexicals, which I mark with
*, can be given as follows:
(65) a. go*  → lpl[lx[le[lw[ move-to(w, e, x, pl);
¬∃y[y ∈ RP(c) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, pl)]] ]]]]
b. come*  → lpl[lx[le[lw[ move-to(w, e, x, pl);
∃y[y ∈ RP(c) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, pl)]] ]]]]
The derivation of the logical form of (64) is illustrated below.13
(66) that Chris came* to San Jose  →
lc[lw[∃e[ move-to(w, e, chris, s.j.); ∃y[y ∈ RP(c) ∧
∃e[at(w, e, y, s.j.)]] ]]]
(67) Bob believessp that Chris came* to San Jose  →
lw[∃e[ believe(w, e, bob, lc[lw[∃e[ move-to(w, e, chris, s.j.);
∃y[y ∈ RP(c) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, s.j.)]] ]]]);
∃e[believe(w, e, bob, lc[lw[Conv(∃e[ move-to(w, e, chris, s.j.);
∃y[y ∈ RP(c) ∧ ∃e[at(w, e, y, s.j.)]] ])]])] ]]
13I assume that the lambda operator that binds the context variable introduced by come* is intro-
duced at the CP node.
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only in his belief.14
10. Summary
In this paper, I proposed that deictic verbs like go/come are instances of indexical
expressions, and argued that the “deictic perspective shift” phenomenon in reported
discoursecan be givena straightforward account under this analysis. An attitudere-
port from the primary deictic perspectiveis non-de se with respect to motion deixis,
and a deictic verb occurring in (the complement clause of) such a report is a pri-
mary indexical. An attitude report from the secondary deictic perspective, on the
other hand, is de se with respect to motion deixis, and a deictic verb occurring in
(the complement clause of) such a report can be understood as a secondary index-
ical in the sense of Schlenker (2003). I further demonstrated that observations of
attitude reports that involve deictic predicates lend support to the view that attitude
predicates can be “holes” for presuppositions.
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